Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-viii

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • Nigel John Ashton

   Pages 1-25

3. The Middle East in 1955

   • Nigel John Ashton

   Pages 26-36

4. The Background to the Formation of the Baghdad Pact

   • Nigel John Ashton

   Pages 37-60

5. March 1956 and the Break with Nasser

   • Nigel John Ashton

   Pages 61-80

6. The Suez Crisis

   • Nigel John Ashton

   Pages 81-102

7. The Eisenhower Doctrine

   • Nigel John Ashton

   Pages 103-113

8. The Bermuda Conference and the April 1957 Crisis in Jordan

   • Nigel John Ashton

   Pages 114-121

9. The Syrian Crisis and the October 1957 Talks

   • Nigel John Ashton

   Pages 122-139

10. The Formation of the United Arab Republic

    • Nigel John Ashton

    Pages 140-149

11. The Lebanese Crisis

    • Nigel John Ashton

    Pages 150-164

12. The Iraqi Revolution

    • Nigel John Ashton

    Pages 165-181

13. The Course and Conclusion of British and American Intervention

    • Nigel John Ashton

    Pages 182-189

14. Post-Revolutionary Iraq and the Reassessment of American and British Strategy

    • Nigel John Ashton

    Pages 190-207

15. Conclusions

    • Nigel John Ashton

    Pages 208-219

16. Postscript: The Kuwaiti Crisis and the Break-up of the United Arab Republic

    • Nigel John Ashton

    Pages 220-232

17. Back Matter

    Pages 233-273

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The years 1955-59 were a vital transitional period for the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East. British and American leaders sought to protect cold war and oil interests in the region against the background of a renaissance of Arab nationalism personified by the Egyptian leader Nasser. With the aid of extensive declassified official documentation, this study traces the British and American responses to the Turco-Iraqi Pact of 1955, the Suez crisis, the Syrian crisis of 1957, the outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958. It shows how the differing priorities of the two powers in the region promoted a patchwork of confrontation and cooperation over Middle Eastern questions. For Britain, this study reveals that it was the Iraqi Revolution rather than Suez which led to a redefinition of strategy in the region, and a concentration on the defence of her oil interests in the Gulf.

• Anglo-American
• cold war
• intervention
• nationalism
• revolution

'Elegantly written and based on the rich archival sources of both states, Ashton's arguments are compelling. Not all scholars of Anglo-American relations will accept his interpretations, but all must grapple with them.' - Peter L. Hahn, The International History Review

'Ashton has outlined a framework for understanding the latter half of the 1950s that future students of the period will want to engage.' - Joel Gordon, American Historical Review

'It is...refreshing to read a account which places 1956 in a longer-term context. Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser by Nigel John Ashton enables one to judge whether the Suez Crisis was quite the dramatic turning-point it is widely supposed to have been.' - David Carlton, Times Literary Supplement

• Department of History, University of Liverpool, UK

  Nigel John Ashton

NIGEL J. ASHTON

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